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AEDPA’S RATCHET: INVOKING THE MIRANDA RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL AFTER THE ANTITERRORISM AND 
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT 
David Rubenstein 
Abstract: In Davis v. United States, the United States Supreme Court established a high 
standard to invoke the Miranda right to counsel, holding that a suspect must make a clear and 
unequivocal request for an attorney. Two years later, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which created a highly deferential standard of review 
for state court judgments challenged under federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Generally, a 
state prisoner challenging the alleged deprivation of his Miranda right to counsel may obtain 
federal court relief under AEDPA only if his conviction in state court was based on an 
“objectively unreasonable” application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent. This Comment 
argues that the AEDPA standard of review effectively raises the bar for individuals to 
successfully invoke their right to counsel above what Davis requires, even outside the habeas 
context. This means that AEDPA’s procedural standard of review has effected a shift in 
substantive law, even if courts did not intend that shift. To remedy this skewing of 
substantive law, this Comment proposes that the Court should discourage trial and direct-
review courts from basing their decisions on AEDPA cases. 
INTRODUCTION 
“I think I would like to talk to a lawyer.”1 “Could I call my lawyer?”2 
“I think I need a lawyer.”3 “I think I might want an attorney.”4 “I think 
maybe I need to talk to a lawyer.”5 “I don’t think I want to say anything 
more until I talk to a lawyer.”6 
A layperson hearing, reading, or speaking any of these phrases might 
reasonably understand them as requests for an attorney, which, in a 
police interrogation, would bar all further questioning without the 
presence of counsel.7 However, courts have determined each of these 
                                                     
1. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003). 
2. Dormire v. Wilkinson, 249 F.3d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 2001). 
3. Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 195 (4th Cir. 2000). 
4. State v. Ellison, 140 P.3d 899, 910 (Ariz. 2006). 
5. State v. Jennings, 647 N.W.2d 142, 151 (Wis. 2002). 
6. United States v. Williams, No. 5:08-CR-174-FL-1, 2009 WL 497143, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 28, 
2009). 
7. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981) (holding that an in-custody criminal 
suspect, having invoked his right to counsel, “is not subject to further interrogation by the 
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 
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phrases to be inadequate to invoke the right to counsel, and they are part 
of a long list of similar phrases deemed insufficient.8 
The rights of a criminal suspect established in Miranda v. Arizona9 
are deeply ingrained in the American popular consciousness.10 Virtually 
anyone who has watched a contemporary police drama will know that 
suspects under arrest have a “right to remain silent,”11 and that they have 
a right to a lawyer present during interrogation, whether or not they can 
afford one.12 Most people likely do not know, however, how a suspect 
invokes his right to counsel. It turns out that doing so is fairly difficult. 
The central reason for this difficulty arises from Davis v. United 
States.13 In Davis, the United States Supreme Court held that police are 
free to question a suspect until he “clearly requests an attorney.”14 
Applying this “clear and unequivocal request” rule, courts have often 
interpreted the phrases uttered by suspects as questions or comments 
about counsel, even when a layperson might interpret them as requests 
for counsel.15 Phrases that employ tentative words, such as “might” or 
“could,” tend to fall short of the Davis “clear request” standard.16 
Exacerbating this trend is the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),17 which imposes an extremely 
deferential standard for review of state court convictions by federal 
courts exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction.18 Under AEDPA, federal 
                                                     
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police”). 
8. See, e.g., 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 859 n.166 (3d ed. 2007) (listing 
dozens of phrases deemed insufficient to invoke); Jon M. Sands & Kim Smith-Stout, Articulating 
Miranda, in THE CHAMPION, Dec. 2005, at 24–25 (listing several more phrases). 
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
10. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (stating that the Miranda warnings 
have “become part of our national culture”). 
11. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. 
12. Id. at 474. But see Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204–05 (2010) (holding 
that Miranda warnings need not expressly include notification that the suspect may have a lawyer 
present during interrogation) (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 198, 203–05 (1989)). 
13. 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
14. Id. at 461. 
15. See, e.g., Dormire v. Wilkinson, 249 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Could I call my 
lawyer?”); see also Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v. United States, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1011, 1034–47 (2007) (analyzing how courts have treated numerous questions and statements about 
counsel after Davis). 
16. Strauss, supra note 15, at 1040–43 (extensively examining what causes a statement or 
question to be equivocal for the purposes of Davis and listing examples). 
17. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). 
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courts cannot overturn a state court’s conviction unless the state court 
rendered “a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established [f]ederal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.”19 This entirely novel standard of 
review means that when a court decides a case under AEDPA, it is not 
saying what the law is; rather it is saying what the limit of the law is. 
That is, it is saying what constitutes a patent transgression of the law, 
and not how the law itself should be applied. 
The distinction is crucial. As federal habeas courts have interpreted 
state Miranda rulings20 through AEDPA’s highly deferential prism, they 
have left undisturbed lower-court decisions holding phrases to be 
inadequate to invoke—phrases the habeas court might otherwise call a 
valid invocation. This process creates a body of invocation pseudo-
precedent. That is, precedent that does not precisely state whether a 
phrase invokes the right to counsel, but instead explains that it was not 
an outright transgression of the law to hold that it did not invoke. That 
pseudo-precedent is then cited by state and federal courts reviewing 
purported invocations de novo, which are sometimes themselves cycled 
through the AEDPA filter. The final outcome of the interplay between 
Davis and AEDPA has been a shift in substantive law: a whittling away 
of the acceptable phrases for invoking the right to counsel to only the 
most obvious.21 That is, a suspect is effectively required to say nothing 
other than the magic words, “I want a lawyer.” 
This Comment analyzes what I will call AEDPA’s “ratchet effect” on 
the standard for invoking the Miranda right to counsel. Part I examines 
the Court’s approach to the right to counsel before 1994. Part II 
discusses the Court’s decision in Davis v. United States, and Part III 
explains the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, its history, 
and its deferential standard of review. Part IV discusses in detail the 
effect AEDPA has had on invocation jurisprudence, and examines two 
                                                     
19. Id. 
20. Those rulings cut strongly against defendants. According to a 2007 study, courts have 
determined that the suspect did not unambiguously invoke the right some eighty-one percent of the 
time. Strauss, supra note 15, at 1055 (examining 391 cases discussing Davis between 1994 and 
2006). But see id. at 1034 (noting that clear and unambiguous invocations of the right to counsel 
may never reach appellate review). On habeas review, where only roughly one percent of petitions 
are successful, a lower rate of invocations deemed adequate is a statistical certainty. See John H. 
Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 284 (2006) (analyzing the 
success rate of AEDPA petitions). 
21. See, e.g., infra notes 192–207 and accompanying text (examining Burket v. Angelone, 208 
F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 2000), in which the phrase, “I think I need a lawyer,” has been cited in at least 
twenty-eight cases to reject similar claimed invocations). 
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illustrative cases with a quantitative analysis of their effects. Finally, 
Part V proposes that the Court should discourage lower courts from 
basing their decisions on AEDPA precedent except when they apply 
AEDPA themselves. 
I. IN MIRANDA V. ARIZONA, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
PLACED SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
WITHOUT STATING HOW IT IS INVOKED 
Access to legal representation is a key value of American criminal 
law. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution specifically requires that 
all criminal defendants have access to an attorney during trial.22 This 
was in part a reaction to English law of the mid-to-late 1700s, which 
barred assistance of counsel in most criminal cases.23 Today, of course, 
the assistance of counsel is considered a fundamental part of any 
criminal proceeding in any American court. For its part, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has protected the Sixth Amendment right to counsel with 
a steadiness that is rare in constitutional criminal procedure.24 Beginning 
in the 1930s, the Court began expanding the right to counsel by setting 
standards for counsel’s performance25 and strengthening waiver 
requirements.26 
The Court has since reached beyond the Sixth Amendment to hold 
that, as a Fifth Amendment matter, a criminal defendant is entitled to the 
assistance of counsel in an adversarial setting even outside the 
courtroom, namely police interrogations. In Miranda v. Arizona,27 the 
Court applied to interrogations the Sixth Amendment notion that a 
                                                     
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
23. See Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1637–41 (2003). 
24. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482–83 (2010) (holding that 
right to effective assistance of counsel applies where deportation is the potential penalty); United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006) (Scalia, J.) (noting that right to counsel rises 
above right to a fair trial, incorporates right to choice of counsel); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 
(1985) (Rehnquist, J.) (stating that right to effective counsel applies at plea stage); McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463–65 (1938) (holding that right to 
counsel may only be forfeited by a knowing and intelligent waiver); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
45, 71 (1932) (holding that criminal defendants have a right to effective counsel in certain capital 
cases). But see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1976) (setting a high standard for 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel). 
25. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (holding that the right to counsel is the right to effective counsel in 
certain capital cases). 
26. See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 463–65 (imposing a knowing-and-intelligent-waiver requirement). 
27. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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layperson would need an attorney to navigate a complicated and 
imposing legal system,28 requiring that accused persons be afforded 
access to counsel, if requested.29 It would be nearly thirty years, 
however, before the Court stated how a suspect should invoke the right 
to counsel that it articulated in Miranda.30 
A. Miranda v. Arizona Established a Post-Arrest Right to Counsel for 
Criminal Suspects 
The ruling of Miranda v. Arizona is quite familiar.31 Barring certain 
key exceptions,32 a criminal suspect in police custody must be informed 
of his or her right to remain silent and to consult an attorney.33 The Court 
designed the Miranda holdings to protect a criminal suspect’s Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination, the concern being that a 
suspect in police custody may feel coerced into incriminating himself.34 
Because of that concern, once a suspect invokes one of the Miranda 
rights, police questioning must cease.35 After a suspect invokes his right 
to counsel, questioning may resume only when the suspect has a lawyer 
present,36 when fourteen days pass after release from custody,37 or when 
the suspect himself reinitiates communication.38 Otherwise, the police 
may not ask the suspect any more questions, and any of the suspect’s 
statements taken in contravention of the rule are inadmissible in court.39 
Miranda has come under fire from many angles. Legal commentators 
have attacked Miranda for years,40 and politicians have long expressed 
                                                     
28. See id. at 510 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[The majority’s holdings] derive from quotation and 
analogy drawn from precedents under the Sixth Amendment, which should properly have no 
bearing on police interrogation.”) 
29. Id. at 467, 469, 471, 473 (majority opinion). 
30. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (holding that a suspect must 
unambiguously and unequivocally request counsel). 
31. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“[Miranda] warnings have become 
part of our national culture.”). 
32. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (carving out an exception to 
Miranda warnings when public safety is threatened). 
33. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–69, 471–72. 
34. Id. at 469–70. 
35. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74. 
36. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85. 
37. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010). 
38. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85. 
39. Id. at 485–87. 
40. See, e.g., Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (1985) 
(proposing Miranda be overruled); see also Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False 
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discontent with the opinion.41 Congress reacted to the decision by 
passing the Crime Control Bill, which attempted to effectively overrule 
Miranda in federal courts.42 As early as 1974, the Court itself expressed 
concern that the Miranda ruling went beyond constitutional 
requirements.43 By the mid-1980s, the Court, especially under Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist, had begun to scale back Miranda’s 
protections by making it more difficult for a suspect to invoke the right 
to counsel44 and limiting the contexts in which the Miranda rights 
attach.45 More recently, the Roberts Court has demonstrated its own 
antipathy to Miranda by siding with the government in three major cases 
concerning the definition of custody,46 the standard for invocation of 
Miranda rights,47 and the now-familiar warnings police must give to 
suspects.48 Yet, Miranda and its progeny survive.49 
                                                     
Confessions and Lost Confessions—And From Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 502–
03 (1998) (arguing Miranda has created high social costs in the form of lost confessions); Paul G. 
Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful 
Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1126–32 (1998) (arguing that Miranda has 
had substantial social costs in its limitations on police and prosecutors). 
41. See, e.g., Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Love-Hate Relationship with Miranda, 101 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 375, 377 (2011) (quoting Richard Nixon describing Miranda as a “legal 
technicalit[y]” that had “very nearly rule[d] out the ‘confession’ as an effective . . . tool in . . . law 
enforcement”). 
42. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, title II, 
§ 701(a), 82 Stat. 210 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006)). In 2000, the U.S. 
Supreme Court struck down the Act to the extent that it conflicted with Miranda. Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (determining that Miranda announced a constitutional rule, 
and that Congress had intended to impermissibly overturn that rule). 
43. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (“[Miranda’s] procedural safeguards [are] 
not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination was protected.”). 
44. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528–29 (1987) (holding that a suspect’s refusal to make 
a written statement without a lawyer did not prevent taking an oral statement). 
45. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 (1984) (carving out a “public safety” exception to 
the Miranda warnings requirement). 
46. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010) (holding that after a break 
in custody of fourteen days, “coercive effect” dissolves); see also Howes v. Fields, No. 10-680 
(U.S. argued Oct. 4, 2011) (considering, under AEDPA standard of review, whether prisoner is 
always in custody for purposes of Miranda when isolated from prison population); but see J.D.B. v. 
North Carolina, 564 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402–03 (2011) (holding by a five to four majority 
that a child’s age may be taken into account when determining custody for purposes of Miranda). 
47. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2256, 2259–60 (2010) (holding that a 
suspect’s three-hour silence did not invoke right to silence), reh’g denied, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 33, 
177 (2010). 
48. Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1206 (2010) (holding that police need not use 
specific language in the warning, so long as they convey Miranda’s essential messages). For more 
on the current court’s outlook regarding Miranda, see generally Kinports, supra note 41. 
49. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443–44 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (refusing 
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B. The Court Placed Greater Protections on the Right to Counsel 
than on the Right to Silence 
Miranda articulated two rights of criminal suspects subjected to 
police interrogation: the right to silence and the right to counsel.50 These 
rights do not accrue automatically, however. Rather, a suspect must 
invoke his rights to silence and counsel by communicating his desire to 
invoke them to his interrogators.51 How a suspect invokes those rights is 
rarely clear, and it varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Despite their 
common origin, the Court has treated the Miranda rights to silence and 
to counsel differently, arguably offering more protection to the right to 
counsel. 
In invocation jurisprudence, there are two central questions: what 
constitutes an invocation, and how must police behave once a right is 
invoked?52 Miranda held that an individual effectively invokes his right 
to remain silent when he “indicates in any manner, at any time prior to 
or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent,” at which point 
“the interrogation must cease.”53 After this, however, the Court did not 
clarify the meaning of the phrase “indicates in any manner” for close to 
thirty years.54 
In the meantime, the Court elaborated on “the interrogation must 
cease” in Michigan v. Mosley,55 holding that police must “scrupulously 
honor[]” a suspect’s rights after he has indicated a desire to remain 
silent.56 The Court identified six factors to determine whether the police 
had scrupulously honored the suspect’s rights: (1) how quickly police 
ceased questioning after the suspect invoked his right to silence; (2) the 
amount of time that elapsed before questioning resumed; (3) whether the 
suspect was advised of his Miranda rights again before questioning 
resumed; (4) whether the same or different officers conducted the second 
interrogation; (5) whether the topic of the second interrogation was the 
same as the first; and (6) the location of the second interrogation.57 
                                                     
to overrule Miranda). 
50. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68, 473 (1966). 
51. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2259–60 (invocations must be affirmative, verbal communication). 
52. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 461 (1994) (requiring suspects to invoke 
unambiguously, but declining to require police to clarify ambiguous requests). 
53. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74. 
54. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (holding that a suspect must unambiguously and unequivocally 
request counsel). 
55. 423 U.S. 96 (1975). 
56. Id. at 104 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
57. See id. at 104–05. 
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The Mosley analysis was the Court’s only significant guidance on the 
right to silence until 2010. In Berghuis v. Thompkins,58 it held that a 
suspect’s three-hour silence in the face of police questioning did not 
constitute an invocation.59 In so holding, the Court answered the first 
invocation question: what constitutes an invocation? The Court imposed 
a “clear and unequivocal request” rule, holding that the suspect had not 
invoked the right, and therefore Mosley was inapplicable.60 
As for the right to counsel, the Court also offered little early guidance 
on the first question, which Berghuis had answered for the right to 
silence: what constitutes an invocation? Miranda was clear that “the 
interrogation must cease” when a suspect “states that he wants an 
attorney,”61 but it did not clarify how that request should be made, nor 
whether or when the interrogation may resume. The Court did not 
answer the first question until 1994 in Davis v. United States,62 which is 
examined in Part II. 
In Edwards v. Arizona,63 however, the Court directly answered the 
second question: how must police behave after a suspect invokes his 
right to counsel?64 The Court articulated a bright-line rule barring further 
questioning after an invocation, until counsel is provided or the suspect 
reinitiates communication.65 In Edwards, a suspect in police custody 
indicated that he wanted to “make a deal,” but only with an attorney 
present, at which point the interrogation stopped.66 The next morning, 
however, the police resumed interrogation without providing a lawyer, 
and the suspect implicated himself in the crime, leading to his 
conviction.67 
The facts in Edwards were similar to those in Mosley. As in Mosley, 
the officer initially cut off questioning immediately after Edwards 
invoked his Miranda rights (this time to counsel), there was a significant 
lapse of time before the second interrogation, the officers in the second 
                                                     
58. 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
59. Id. at 2258, 2260. 
60. Id. at 2260. 
61. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. The Miranda decision also stated that questioning must cease 
when the suspect “indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult 
with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.” Id. at 444–45. 
62. 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
63. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
64. See id. at 485. 
65. Id. at 484–85. 
66. Id. at 479 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
67. Id. at 479. 
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interrogation were different from the original questioning officer, and 
they warned him of his Miranda rights before beginning the second 
interrogation.68 Additionally, the second group of officers directly 
refused to honor Edwards’ request to remain silent.69 Yet, the Court did 
not apply Mosley’s flexible “scrupulously honored” rule. Rather, when 
Edwards challenged the use of his statements at trial, the Court held that 
“an accused, . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only 
through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities 
until counsel has been made available to him.”70 The Edwards holding 
created a “rigid prophylactic rule,”71 barring all further questioning after 
a suspect invokes the Miranda right to counsel until an attorney is 
present.72 Edwards had no effect on the right to silence, however, which 
is still governed by Mosley’s more flexible “scrupulously honored” 
analysis, in which the passage of time and other factors mitigate the 
effect of an invocation of the right to silence.73 
Having established a “rigid prophylactic rule,” the Edwards Court 
went on to strengthen it by answering a third question: what constitutes a 
waiver? The Court held that merely responding to police questioning 
after invoking the right to counsel does not establish a waiver, even if 
police re-advise the suspect of his rights.74 Rather, questioning cannot 
continue without counsel present “unless the accused himself initiates 
further communication . . . with the police.”75 Thus, Edwards made clear 
that the right to counsel is well protected and that once invoked, it 
triggers a procedural safeguard more rigid than the one articulated in 
Mosley for the right to silence.76 
                                                     
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 484–85. 
71. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 
(1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
72. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85. 
73. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104–05 (1975) (using six factors to determine whether 
police scrupulously honored a suspect’s rights); see also Strauss, supra note 15, at 1020–21 
(examining the more stringent effect of a right-to-counsel invocation, as compared to the right to 
silence under Mosley). 
74. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. 
75. Id. at 484–85. 
76. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2275 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994)) (“To the extent Mosley 
contemplates a more flexible form of prophylaxis than Edwards—and, in particular, does not 
categorically bar police from reapproaching a suspect who has invoked his right to remain silent—
Davis’ concern about wholly irrational obstacles to police investigation applies with less force.”). 
(internal quotation marks omitted) 
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C. In Edwards, the Court Did Not Make Clear What a Suspect Must 
Say to Invoke the Right to Counsel nor What Police Should Do 
When Faced with an Unclear Invocation 
The Edwards ruling left unanswered the question how a suspect must 
“express[] his desire to deal with the police only through counsel.”77 
Neither did Edwards answer the question of how police should proceed 
when faced with a statement that might be an invocation. 
In response, state and federal courts developed three main approaches 
to address unclear invocations in the thirteen years before the U.S. 
Supreme Court stepped in.78 The first and broadest approach, embraced 
primarily by the Sixth Circuit, held that any statement that could be 
construed as a request for counsel validly invokes the right such that the 
interrogation must cease.79 Other courts developed a narrow approach in 
which only very clear requests for counsel would require police officers 
to immediately cease questioning under Edwards, and the police were 
free to ignore any ambiguous requests.80 Most federal courts, however, 
took a middle approach (or clarification approach) in which officers 
faced with an ambiguous request must ask only questions intended to 
                                                     
77. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85; see also Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95–96 (1984) (per 
curiam) (noting a division of the courts on the consequences of an ambiguous or equivocal 
invocation, but declining to resolve it). Before 1994, the Court decided numerous cases surrounding 
Miranda invocations, and right-to-counsel invocations in particular, but they were all intended to 
clarify the Edwards decision, rather than extend a ruling dictating what authorities must do when 
faced with an ambiguous waiver. See, e.g., Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 57–59 (1985) (deciding 
Edwards’ applicability to pending cases); Smith, 469 U.S. at 98–99 (holding that a suspect’s post-
invocation statements cannot be used to impute ambiguity onto the invocation); Solem v. Stumes, 
465 U.S. 638, 650 (1984) (holding Edwards not retroactively applicable); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 
U.S. 1039, 1045–46 (1983) (explaining that a suspect initiates communication when he “evince[s] a 
willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation”). 
78. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 456 (noting the three approaches). 
79. See, e.g., Bailey v. Hamby, 744 F.2d 24, 26–27 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that suspect’s 
statement “I’d like to talk to an attorney or something like that” was adequate to invoke) (emphasis 
omitted); Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 203, 205–06 (6th Cir. 1978) (statement, “Maybe I should 
have an attorney,” adequate to invoke; burden placed on state to establish waiver whenever 
statement taken without counsel present); see also McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797, 799–801 
(8th Cir. 1982) (statement that suspect’s brother “told me he thought I needed a lawyer, an attorney, 
my brother did, and I didn’t really think I needed one, really and truly” a valid invocation).  
80. See, e.g., People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Ill. 1980) (holding that statements “Maybe 
I ought to have an attorney,” “Maybe I need a lawyer,” or “Maybe I ought to talk to an attorney” did 
not invoke); State v. Moore, 744 S.W.2d 479, 480–81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (statement “[M]aybe [I] 
should have an attorney” did not invoke); see also Scott R. Goings, Comment, Ambiguous or 
Equivocal Requests for Counsel in Custodial Interrogations After Davis v. United States, 81 IOWA 
L. REV. 161, 161–63, 162 n.8 (1995) (discussing the “threshold of clarity approach”); Strauss, supra 
note 15, at 1022–23 (discussing the three approaches). 
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clarify whether or not the suspect actually desired counsel.81 Many state 
courts favored this approach as well.82 
While lower courts developed these three approaches, the U.S. 
Supreme Court remained deferential to suspects in other areas of 
Miranda law. In Smith v. Illinois,83 for example, the Court held that 
police could not use a suspect’s responses to questioning after invoking 
the right to counsel “to cast doubt on the adequacy of the initial request 
itself,” saying such a practice is “intolerable.”84 The Court continued to 
strengthen Edwards’ bright-line rule throughout the 1980s and into the 
early 1990s. In Arizona v. Roberson,85 the Court held that a right-to-
counsel invocation applies to all police questioning, not just to questions 
about a particular offense.86 Two years later, in Minnick v. Mississippi,87 
the Court clarified that Edwards bars police from “reinitiat[ing] 
interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has 
consulted with his attorney.”88 In each case before 1994, however, the 
Court declined to resolve the questions of how clearly a suspect must 
request counsel to validly invoke the right and what police should do in 
the face of an ambiguous request.89 
                                                     
81. Strauss, supra note 15, at 1022–23, 1023 n.83 (citing numerous federal courts following the 
clarification approach, along with one state court); see also United States v. Fouche, 833 F.2d 1284, 
1287 (9th Cir. 1987) (FBI agents required to clarify suspect’s statement that he “might want to talk 
to a lawyer”). The Ninth Circuit retained this approach even after Davis insofar as the ambiguous 
statement was made before a Miranda waiver. United States v. Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072, 1078–79 
n.6 (9th Cir. 2008). It reasoned that because the express elimination in Davis of any clarification 
requirement for police came in a case specifically limited to post-waiver scenarios, its clarification 
rule was only partially abrogated. Id.; see also infra note 238 (discussing AEDPA’s effect on the 
Fouche rule). 
82. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 466–67 n.1 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing state 
courts following the clarification approach); see also State v. Moulds, 673 P.2d 1074, 1082 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1983) (adopting the clarification approach). 
83. 469 U.S. 91 (1984). 
84. Id. at 98–99 (emphasis in original). 
85. 486 U.S. 675 (1988). 
86. Id. at 677–78. 
87. 498 U.S. 146 (1990). 
88. Id. at 153. 
89. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 n.3 (1987) (declining to resolve the question of 
how courts should treat ambiguous or equivocal invocations); see also Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 
91, 95–96 n.3 (1984) (per curiam) (noting a division of courts on the consequences of an ambiguous 
or equivocal invocation, but declining to resolve it). 
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II.  IN DAVIS V. UNITED STATES, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
ADOPTED A NARROW APPROACH TO RIGHT-TO-
COUNSEL INVOCATIONS 
The Court resolved both questions in 1994 when it decided Davis v. 
United States,90 which signaled a shift toward placing the burden of 
clarity in Miranda invocations onto suspects.91 
A. The Davis Decision Articulated a High Standard for How Clearly 
Suspects Must Invoke the Miranda Right to Counsel. 
In Davis v. United States, Davis, a member of the United States Navy, 
was arrested in connection with the murder of a fellow sailor.92 Upon 
learning of his involvement, Naval Investigative Service agents advised 
Davis that he was a suspect in the killing, gave him warnings consistent 
with both Miranda and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and 
proceeded to interview him.93 Davis waived his rights to silence and to 
counsel, both orally and in writing.94 About ninety minutes into the 
interview, Davis stated, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.”95 At that 
point, the agents re-advised Davis of his rights and told him the 
interview would stop if he did indeed want a lawyer.96 Davis responded, 
“No, I’m not asking for a lawyer . . . I don’t want a lawyer,” and the 
interview continued.97 After another hour of interrogation, Davis said “I 
think I want a lawyer before I say anything else,” at which point the 
interview ceased.98 At his general court martial, the Military Judge 
denied Davis’ motion to suppress the statements he had made after he 
said, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.”99 
                                                     
90. 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
91. See id. at 469–70 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 
n.6 (1986) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966)) (internal quotation marks and 
brackets omitted) (noting that a concern about linguistic capacities of suspects “thrust” into 
interrogation “has, in the past, dissuaded the Court from placing any burden of clarity upon 
individuals in custody, but has led it instead to require that requests for counsel be given a broad, 
rather than a narrow, interpretation”). 
92. Id. at 454 (majority opinion).  
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 455. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.100 The Court held that “after a 
knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement 
officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly 
requests an attorney.”101 The Court held that trial judges should assess 
the clarity of the request under an objective inquiry “to avoid difficulties 
of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting 
interrogations.”102 
Davis answered the first question left open in Edwards: how must a 
suspect “state[] that he wants an attorney”?103 In her majority opinion, 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor began by clarifying that the Miranda right 
to counsel is not itself a constitutional right, but rather a procedural 
safeguard designed to protect the constitutional right against self-
incrimination.104 She recognized, however, that despite its protective 
purpose, the Court had not yet made clear what sort of statement “can 
reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance 
of an attorney.”105 With that in mind, she set a new standard of clarity: a 
“suspect must unambiguously request counsel . . . . [H]e must articulate 
his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable 
police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be 
a request for an attorney.”106 
The majority recognized that the new rule would disadvantage some 
                                                     
100. Id. at 462. 
101. Id. at 461. 
102. Id. at 458–59 (citing Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987)). Some scholars have 
noted that eliminating the intent element from an inquiry into linguistic meaning is a self-
contradiction. David Aram Kaiser & Paul Lufkin, Deconstructing Davis v. United States: Intention 
and Meaning in Ambiguous Requests for Counsel, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 737, 755–56 (2005). 
That is, it is impossible for there to be a truly objective inquiry into a request because that inquiry is 
designed to discover the speaker’s subjective intent, and “every interpreter implicitly provides a 
context and a hypothetical speaker’s intent.” Id. at 756–58. Moreover, it is absurd, they argue, to 
require objective clarity of language when a speaker’s intent is plain. Id. at 747 (quoting Steven 
Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Reply to John Searle, 25 NEW LITERARY HIST. 669, 671 (1994)). 
103. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966). 
104. Davis, 512 U.S. at 457 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443–44 (1974)). 
105. Id. at 459 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
106. Id. The Court limited the applicability of its new “clear and unequivocal request” rule, as it 
has come to be called, to invocations made after the suspect had waived his Miranda rights. The 
Court made this explicit in its holding: “We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless 
the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” Id. at 461. The Court’s rationale also reflected this logic. It 
reasoned that a suspect who had waived his rights “has indicated his willingness to deal with the 
police unassisted.” Id. at 460–61. If the suspect later wants a lawyer present, the Court stated, it is 
his burden to “affirmatively invoke[]” that right. Id. at 461. 
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suspects “because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a 
variety of other reasons.”107 However, the Court explained, the Miranda 
warnings themselves are the primary protection, and “full 
comprehension of the rights” suffices to counterbalance the coercive 
effect of police interrogation.108 Thus, the Court held that it is the 
warnings themselves—rather than facile invocation of the rights—that 
constitute the substance of Miranda’s protection.109 
Having answered the first question left open in Edwards, the Court 
went on to answer the second: what must police do after an unclear 
invocation? Justice O’Connor observed that a rule requiring police to 
stop questioning whenever a suspect utters a statement that “might be a 
request for an attorney” would soften the Edwards bright-line rule 
requiring police to immediately cease questioning.110 It would, she 
wrote, cloud its “clarity and ease of application” and undermine 
effective law enforcement by introducing uncertainty into 
interrogations.111 As such, the Court held that “after a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may 
                                                     
107. Id. at 460. In his concurrence, Justice Souter took particular umbrage at this likelihood, 
using it to argue for a clarification rule. See id. at 469–70 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“A substantial percentage of [suspects] lack anything like a confident command of the English 
language, many are ‘woefully ignorant,’ and many more will be sufficiently intimidated by the 
interrogation process or overwhelmed by the uncertainty of their predicament that the ability to 
speak assertively will abandon them.”) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468) (citations omitted). A 
number of scholars have also seized on this as an injustice in Davis. E.g., Strauss, supra note 15, at 
1030–31; Yale Kamisar, Constitutional Law Conference Addresses Supreme Court’s 1993-94 Term, 
56 CRIM. L. REP. 1068–69 (1994); Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of 
Powerlessness in Police Interrogations, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 261 (1993). Certain subsequent cases 
have borne out Justice Souter’s fears. See, e.g., Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1231–33, 1235 
(10th Cir. 2000) (upholding that Mexican immigrant’s statement, “Yes, I understand it a little bit 
and I sign it because I understand it something about a lawyer and he want to ask me questions and 
that’s what I’m looking for a lawyer,” after signing Miranda waiver form and confessing, was 
ambiguous on AEDPA review). 
108. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
109. See id. 
110. Id. at 461. 
111. Id. (“The Edwards rule—questioning must cease if the suspect asks for a lawyer—provides 
a bright line that can be applied by officers in the real world of investigation and interrogation 
without unduly hampering the gathering of information. But if we were to require questioning to 
cease if a suspect makes a statement that might be a request for an attorney, this clarity and ease of 
application would be lost. Police officers would be forced to make difficult judgment calls about 
whether the suspect in fact wants a lawyer even though he has not said so, with the threat of 
suppression if they guess wrong.”) (emphasis in original). Some have pointed out that this is 
backwards logic. E.g., Strauss, supra note 15, at 1028–29. It introduces far more uncertainty to 
require a clarity analysis, rather than simply imposing an across-the-board cutoff at all requests for 
counsel, however ambiguous. Id. 
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continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an 
attorney.”112 The Court expressly declined to adopt a rule requiring 
police to ask only clarifying questions after an ambiguous invocation.113 
B. Davis Became the Standard for Right-to-Counsel Invocations 
Legal commentators widely attacked Davis. Some criticized the 
decision for introducing into interrogations the very uncertainty that the 
Court sought to avoid.114 Others argued that the rule would create a 
disproportionate disadvantage for certain groups who, “by virtue of their 
education, socio-economic background, gender or national origin are 
virtually incapable of meeting such a standard of linguistic clarity.”115 
Despite the scholarly criticism, most courts have followed Davis at 
least to some extent, including the vast majority of state courts.116 
Although federal courts are bound by the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings, 
some have limited Davis’ application to statements made after a suspect 
has waived his Miranda rights.117 Certain state courts have declined to 
follow Davis on state constitutional grounds. The highest courts in 
Minnesota,118 Hawaii,119 New Jersey,120 and West Virginia121 have each 
interpreted their own state constitutions as providing greater protection 
to suspects than Davis would.122 Other state courts have established their 
own limits to the Davis rule, such as rules allowing the consideration of 
contextual factors in interpreting a purported invocation of the Miranda 
                                                     
112. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461. Courts have often misinterpreted this express holding. See infra note 
238 
113. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461–63. Four justices, led by Justice David Souter, advocated for the 
clarification rule, arguing that it would have put the Court in line with the majority of federal 
appellate courts. Id. at 466–67 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
114. See supra note 111. 
115. Strauss, supra note 15, at 1027 (quoting Kaiser & Lufkin, supra note 102, at 756) (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also id. at 1012 nn.10 & 11 (listing several articles 
examining the possibility of disadvantages to certain groups); supra note 107 (discussing Justice 
Souter’s prediction of this likelihood). 
116. Strauss, supra note 15, at 1032. 
117. E.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072, 1078–79 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008). 
118. State v. Risk, 598 N.W.2d 642, 648–49 (Minn. 1999). 
119. State v. Hoey, 881 P.2d 504, 523 (Haw. 1994). 
120. State v. Chew, 695 A.2d 1301, 1318 (N.J. 1997). 
121. See State v. Farley, 452 S.E.2d 50, 59 n.12 (W. Va. 1994) (reserving the question of whether 
to apply Davis and expressing support for the clarification approach); see also State v. Bradshaw, 
457 S.E.2d 456, 466 n.7 (W. Va. 1995) (same). 
122. Strauss, supra note 15, at 1032. 
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right to counsel.123 
Two years after the Court decided Davis, which narrowed criminal 
suspects’ rights prior to conviction, Congress passed a statute that 
limited the relief available to state prisoners after conviction. 
III. THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY 
ACT CREATED A HIGHLY DEFERENTIAL STANDARD FOR 
FEDERAL REVIEW OF STATE COURT CONVICTIONS 
AEDPA, enacted by Congress in 1996,124 drastically altered the relief 
available to state prisoners under the federal writ of habeas corpus. The 
statute made it significantly more difficult for a federal court to overturn 
a state court conviction.125 It did not produce this effect on its own, 
however. Since the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court had been creating 
procedural obstructions to the writ, making it increasingly “difficult for 
state court inmates to thread the habeas needle.”126 
A. Before AEDPA, Federal Courts Reviewed Constitutional 
Challenges to State Convictions De Novo 
The writ of habeas corpus allows a person subject to confinement to 
petition a court for a determination that the confinement is unjust.127 
Prior to 1867, the Great Writ, as the federal writ of habeas corpus is 
sometimes called,128 was only available to prisoners convicted in a 
                                                     
123. In State v. Dumas, 750 A.2d 420, 425 (R.I. 2000), for example, the Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island considered whether the question “Can I get a lawyer?” was a clear and unambiguous request 
for counsel under Davis. In its analysis, the court noted that, depending on context, sometimes 
questions are understood as requests (“Can I get some service over here?” said to a sales clerk) and 
sometimes as simple questions (“Can I get a slice of pepperoni pizza?” said in a pizza parlor not 
clearly selling pizza by the slice, or, for that matter, pepperoni pizza). Id. at 425 n.5. The court 
remanded the case so that the trial court could consider the context of the question, including 
responses from the interrogating officers. Id. at 425–26. 
124. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
125. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006); see also Blume, supra note 20, at 284. 
126. Blume, supra note 20, at 297; see also id. at 265–70 (explaining Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
antipathy to federal review of state convictions and listing cases restricting that review during his 
time on the Court). 
127. Margery I. Miller, Note, A Different View of Habeas: Interpreting AEDPA’s “Adjudicated 
on the Merits” Clause When Habeas Corpus Is Understood As an Appellate Function of the Federal 
Courts, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2593, 2606 (2004). 
128. See, e.g., Lynn Adelman, The Great Writ Diminished, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 3, 3 (2009). 
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federal court.129 The federal government arrogated to itself the power to 
grant the writ to state prisoners in its post-Civil War backlash against 
state power.130 Congress lodged that power in the federal courts with the 
passage of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.131 The modern history of 
habeas corpus law, however, begins with Brown v. Allen,132 which 
established that federal habeas corpus review of state court convictions 
was de novo for pure and mixed questions of federal constitutional 
law.133 
The next watershed moment in the evolution of the habeas standard of 
review came in 1989. In Teague v. Lane,134 the Court held that federal 
courts could not entertain habeas claims that ask the court to expand 
federal constitutional rights.135 The result was that federal habeas corpus 
cases could not contribute to the development of criminal law, except in 
the rarest of cases.136 In one sense, Teague can be seen as a precursor to 
AEDPA insofar as it required that habeas courts not announce 
constitutional rules “not dictated by precedent.”137 This admonition was 
later clarified to mean that not even a modest extension of existing 
precedent was allowed, but, unlike AEDPA, there was no restriction to 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent.138 Still, even in its moments of antipathy 
toward federal habeas review of state court convictions,139 the Court left 
untouched the de novo standard for reviewing state courts’ application of 
established federal constitutional law.140 
                                                     
129. Miller, supra note 127, at 2606. 
130. See id. at 2606–07. 
131. Id. 
132. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
133. Brown, 344 U.S. at 467–74 (giving de novo review to a question of federal constitutional 
law); id. at 507 (Frankfurter, J.) (“[S]o-called mixed questions or the application of constitutional 
principles to the facts as found leave the duty of adjudication with the federal judge.”); Miller, supra 
note 127, at 2607–08; see also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 299–301 (1992) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (discussing the “certainty with which Brown v. Allen rejected a deferential standard of 
review of issues of law”). 
134. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
135. Id. at 310; Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas Corpus Under 
the New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1870 (1997). 
136. Note, supra note 135, at 1870. 
137. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. 
138. Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for Rights-First Constitutional 
Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595, 604 (2009). 
139. See Blume, supra note 20, at 265–70 (listing cases restricting habeas review during 
Rehnquist’s time on the Court). 
140. See, e.g., Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232 (1994) (stating that the preclusive effect of a 
jury verdict is a question of federal law reviewed de novo). 
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B. Congress Intended AEDPA’s Standard of Review to Minimize 
Federal Involvement in State Court Convictions 
AEDPA imposed an entirely novel standard of review on federal 
courts exercising habeas jurisdiction. Among many other provisions,141 
AEDPA’s habeas section—part of a much larger bill—includes what 
became 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which provides that a federal court 
sitting in habeas jurisdiction may not overturn a state decision merely 
because that decision is incorrect.142 Rather, AEDPA requires that a 
federal habeas court ask whether the state court’s opinion is “contrary to, 
or involved an unreasonable application of,” U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent.143 Where there is no U.S. Supreme Court decision on point, 
there can be no precedent to unreasonably apply, and the conviction 
must stand.144 Congressional proponents intended this highly deferential 
standard of review to expedite justice and minimize federal involvement 
in settled state court convictions.145 
Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole introduced the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act on April 27, 1995, eight days after the 
Oklahoma City bombing and roughly two weeks after he announced he 
would seek the presidency.146 Referring to the bombing, Senator Dole 
told Congress that the bill would ensure “that those who committed this 
evil deed will get what they deserve—punishment that is swift, certain, 
and severe.”147 Title VII of Senator Dole’s bill addressed the federal writ 
of habeas corpus as applied to state prisoners, while its other sections 
                                                     
141. See Blume, supra note 20, at 270–74 (discussing AEDPA’s sections creating a statue of 
limitations, barring successive petitions, exhaustion requirements, etc.). 
142. Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What’s Wrong with 
It and How to Fix It, 33 CONN. L. REV. 919, 926 (2001); Krystal M. Moore, Comment, Is Saving an 
Innocent Man a “Fool’s Errand”? The Limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act on an Original Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 197, 206–07 (2011). 
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).  
144. See id.; Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that where the U.S. 
Supreme Court has expressly left a question open, it cannot be “clearly established” and courts 
applying AEDPA must affirm). 
145. See 141 CONG. REC. S7808 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (AEDPA 
would prevent “incessant, frivolous appeals ad [infinitum]”); id. at S7839 (statement of Sen. Cohen) 
(“So let us not fool ourselves. The substantive changes to the habeas bill being proposed are not 
designed just to eliminate frivolous cases. They are designed to weaken the [f]ederal courts’ role in 
scrutinizing [s]tate court verdicts for constitutional error.”).  
146. 141 CONG. REC. S5841 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole); David Johnston, 
At Least 31 Are Dead, Scores Are Missing After Car Bomb Attack in Oklahoma City Wrecks 9-Story 
Federal Office Building, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at A1; Dan Balz, Dole Begins 3rd Bid for 
White House, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1995, at A1. 
147. 141 CONG. REC. S5841 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole). 
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related to strengthening law enforcement and combating terrorism.148 
President Bill Clinton signed the final version of the bill on April 24, 
1996, the effective date of the law.149 The Conference Committee report 
accompanying the final version focuses primarily on the procedural 
elements of the habeas provision.150 It only briefly mentions the new 
standard of review, saying, “[The bill] requires deference to the 
determinations of state courts that are neither ‘contrary to,’ nor an 
‘unreasonable application of,’ clearly established federal law.”151 This is 
the report’s only mention of the new standard of review,152 although the 
provision has had a profound effect on the adjudication of federal habeas 
petitions.153 
                                                     
148. Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, S. 735, 104th Cong. §§ 701–08 (as 
introduced, Apr. 27, 1995). Dole’s bill, S. 735, incorporated verbatim the language of the latest 
iteration of a twenty-seven-page bill introduced a month earlier by Sen. Arlen Specter, which, like 
its previous versions, had languished in committee. Compare Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1995, 
S. 623, 104th Cong. (as introduced, Mar. 24, 1995), with S. 735. Dole’s bill, however, included an 
additional 126 pages, mostly geared at fighting terrorism, and a new title. S.735, §§ 101–601, 
§§ 721–901. The bill passed the Senate six weeks later by a vote of 91 to 8, the habeas corpus 
section largely untouched. 141 CONG. REC. S7857, S7868–71 (daily ed. June 7, 1995); 
Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, S. 735, 104th Cong. §§ 601–08 (as passed by 
Senate June 7, 1995). 
 Notably, then-Senator Joe Biden was vocally opposed to the bill, including its novel standard of 
review, which he called “a heck of a standard to have to apply.” 141 CONG. REC. S7841 (daily ed. 
June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden). Senator Biden, who had lost his chairmanship of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee a few months prior, was especially concerned about the elimination of the 
right to counsel in habeas proceedings and the fact that the bill would “make[] sweeping changes in 
the rules of the game.” Id. at S7812–13. Others were concerned that the “deference provision” 
would effectively “repeal the habeas corpus statute.” Id. at S7839 (statement of Sen. Cohen) 
(quoting Professor Henry Monaghan). Perhaps hoping Dole’s bill would suffer the same fate as 
Specter’s, Senator Biden first proposed amending the bill to remove the “95 percent of [it]” that was 
“not germane” to habeas corpus reform, leaving only those provisions dealing with federal 
prisoners. Id. at S7806. Biden later went so far as to introduce an amendment to eliminate the 
“deference rule.” Id. at S7840. He was joined in his opposition by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
who stated outright, “This legislation will eviscerate the writ of habeas corpus . . . .” Id. at S7878–9 
(statement of Sen. Moynihan). Ultimately, Senator Biden voted for the bill, while Moynihan did not. 
Id. at S7857. 
149. Presidential Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 630 (Apr. 24, 1996). When he signed the bill, President Clinton noted the 
concern of its detractors and suggested that he would not have signed it if he thought courts would 
“interpret [it] in a manner that would undercut meaningful [f]ederal habeas corpus review.” Id. at 
631. He also raised the same constitutional concerns that have come up since. Id.; see also infra 
notes 171–174 and accompanying text. 
150. See generally H.R. REP. No. 104-518 (1996) (Conf. rep.). 
151. Id. at 111. 
152. See id. 
153. See Adelman, supra note 128, at 15–20 (Judge Adelman discussing the effect that AEDPA’s 
deference provisions have had both in his court in the Eastern District of Wisconsin and in the 
federal judiciary generally). But see Blume, supra note 20, at 261 (arguing that AEDPA has not had 
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For all of its import, § 2254, generally considered the “centerpiece of 
AEDPA,”154 is often described as “vague.”155 The U.S. Supreme Court 
has made some effort to clarify it. Referring to the much-discussed 
§ 2254, it offered this formulation in Brown v. Payton156: 
A state-court decision is contrary to this Court’s clearly 
established precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the 
governing law set forth in our cases, or if it confronts a set of 
facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of this 
Court but reaches a different result. A state-court decision 
involves an unreasonable application of this Court’s clearly 
established precedents if the state court applies this Court’s 
precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner.157 
The Court has made several other attempts to clarify how courts 
should apply § 2254.158 In Williams v. Taylor,159 for example, the Court 
interpreted the phrases “contrary to” and “unreasonable application of” 
found in the statute.160 The Court suggested that AEDPA created an 
entirely novel standard of review.161 Justice Stevens explained that the 
statutory text does not identify a familiar standard of review such as “de 
novo” or “plain error.”162 “Rather, the text is fairly read simply as a 
command that a federal court not issue the habeas writ unless the state 
                                                     
the profound effect that its proponents and detractors expected). 
154. Blume, supra note 20, at 272. 
155. E.g. LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: HABEAS CORPUS 57 (2003) (“AEDPA is 
notorious for its poor drafting. The Act is replete with vague and ambiguous language, apparent 
inconsistency, and plain bad grammar.”); James S. Liebman, An “Effective Death Penalty”? 
AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 426 (2001) (“AEDPA 
complicates review . . . because of its poor drafting.”). The Court itself has expressed dismay at the 
vagueness of the statute’s drafting. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) (“All we can say is 
that in a world of silk purses and pigs’ ears, the Act is not a silk purse of the art of statutory 
drafting.”). 
156. 544 U.S. 133 (2005). 
157. Id. at 141 (citations omitted). 
158. See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 770, 783–87 (2011) (quoting 
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)) (analyzing the phrases “contrary to” and 
“unreasonable application of”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402–13 (2000) (same); see also 
Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1): A Commentary on Statutory 
Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 677, 699 (2003) (pointing out that 
Williams’ value is undermined by a split in the decision in discussions surrounding the rule 
articulated and its proper application). 
159. 529 U.S. 362. 
160. Id. at 402–13. 
161. Id. at 385 (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
162. Id. Stevens was not writing for a majority in that section of his opinion. Id. at 367. The 
majority, however, echoed his logic. Id. at 404 (majority opinion). 
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court was wrong as a matter of law or unreasonable in its application of 
law in a given case.”163 Stevens wrote that in so commanding, Congress 
expressed a “mood” that state court decisions must be reviewed with the 
utmost care and deference.164 
The Court recently strengthened the instruction in Williams v. Taylor 
that federal habeas courts should give substantial deference to state 
decisions. In Harrington v. Richter,165 the Court emphasized that habeas 
corpus review is only “a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state 
criminal justice systems,”166 stating: 
If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant 
to be. As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of 
imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims 
already rejected in state proceedings. It preserves authority to 
issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded 
jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts 
with this Court’s precedents. It goes no farther.167 
Justice O’Connor warned in Williams that defining the “unreasonable 
application” provision with reference to a “reasonable jurist” does not 
mean a decision is valid merely because “at least one of the [n]ation’s 
jurists has applied the relevant federal law in the same manner the state 
court did.”168 This admonition is not always followed, however.169 
Federal courts have sometimes strained against the strictness of the 
§ 2254 standard, especially where the outcome seems unjust. For 
example, in Irons v. Carey,170 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the district court’s granting of a writ of habeas corpus to 
a prisoner denied release by a state parole board.171 The court reluctantly 
adhered to AEDPA’s standard and held that the parole board’s ruling 
was reasonable, despite the district court’s ruling to the contrary.172 All 
                                                     
163. Id. at 385 (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
164. Id. at 386 (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). 
165. 562 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011). 
166. Id. at 786 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
167. Id. (citations omitted) 
168. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410.  
169. Adelman, supra note 128, at 16–17 (lamenting the fact that this “unfortunate side effect[]” 
of AEDPA “drives constitutional protections for criminal defendants down to the lowest common 
denominator”). 
170. 505 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 
546, 555 (9th Cir. 2010). 
171. Id. at 854. 
172. Id. at 852 (“Although we agree with the district court that the other bases for the Board’s 
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three members of the panel wrote separate concurrences.173 Two decried 
AEDPA as nearly unconstitutional insofar as Congress was 
“determin[ing] how a federal court shall decide a case.”174 The Fifth 
Circuit has also expressed its frustration with AEDPA: 
It is beyond regrettable that a possibly innocent man will not 
receive a new trial in the face of the preposterously unreliable 
testimony of the victim and sole eyewitness to the crime for 
which he was convicted. But, our hands are tied by AEDPA . . . , 
so we dutifully dismiss his claim.175 
Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has reversed at least a dozen 
circuit court decisions granting habeas writs in spite of what the Court 
viewed as “clearly established [f]ederal law.”176 Finally, until 2003 the 
Ninth Circuit had applied its own approach to AEDPA, requiring federal 
courts in that circuit to review the state court’s decision de novo prior to 
applying AEDPA’s deferential standard of review.177 The Court 
expressly overturned this approach.178 
IV. AEDPA’S STANDARD OF REVIEW CREATES A ONE-WAY 
RATCHET AGAINST SUSPECTS’ MIRANDA RIGHTS 
The AEDPA standard of review directs federal courts to state whether 
another court’s application of the Davis “clear and unequivocal request” 
rule was reasonable, rather than apply the Davis rule itself. This creates a 
kind of pseudo-precedent that does not really state the law, but instead 
states what is not an “unreasonable application of the law,” a distinction 
                                                     
unsuitability determination . . . were wholly unsupported by ‘some evidence,’ . . . we are unable to 
conclude that the Board’s findings regarding the nature of the commitment offense were without 
some evidentiary support.”) 
173. Id. at 854–59 (Noonan, J., concurring); id. at 859 (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially); id. at 
859–60 (Fernandez, J., concurring). 
174. Id. at 854 (Noonan, J., concurring); id. at 859 (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially). 
175. Kinsel v. Cain, 647 F.3d 265, 273–74 (5th Cir. 2011). 
176. Stephen I. Vladeck, supra note 138, at 595. 
177. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). The Ninth Circuit had been following the rule 
in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000), which required that courts first decide 
whether or not the decision under review was in error, and then proceed to the question of whether 
the decision was “reasonable.” In so holding, it alluded to problems of obscuring constitutional 
jurisprudence and its role in providing guidance to state courts. Id. (“Requiring federal courts to first 
determine whether the state court’s decision was erroneous, prior to considering whether it was 
contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of controlling law under AEDPA, promotes 
clarity in our own constitutional jurisprudence and also provides guidance for state courts, which 
can look to our decisions for their persuasive value.”). 
178. Id. 
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trial and direct-review courts often fail to note. That pseudo-precedent, 
extremely deferential to state courts, will almost always favor the 
prosecution, holding state-court rejections of right to counsel invocations 
were “reasonable.” As illustrated by a quantitative analysis of two cases 
below, other courts not applying AEDPA then rely on that pseudo-
precedent over and over again to reject purported invocations. 
Ultimately, what was originally a statement of what was not an 
unreasonable application of Davis becomes a substantive definition of a 
clear and unequivocal request. These phenomena, working in tandem, 
create a one-way ratchet, narrowing the phrases that can invoke the right 
to counsel. 
A. AEDPA Has Led Federal Courts to Narrow the Davis Rule for 
Invoking the Miranda Right to Counsel 
Under AEPDA, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, federal 
courts reviewing state court convictions do not directly apply the 
relevant law.179 Rather, AEDPA directs them to ascertain what the law 
is, as determined by the Court, and then decide whether the state court’s 
interpretation falls within the reasonable limits of the law’s 
application.180 Therefore, in the right-to-counsel context, federal courts 
applying AEDPA to state prisoners’ habeas petitions must ask whether 
an invocation could possibly be construed as ambiguous or equivocal. 
Framing the question this way begs an affirmative answer. 
It is important to understand the magnitude of deference that AEDPA 
requires, as compared to a de novo standard, and it bears repeating here. 
Courts applying AEDPA are powerless to identify rights and limitations 
on their own and to use glosses on the law established by lower courts. 
Under an ordinary de novo standard of review, a federal court could ask, 
“What is the law as this circuit sees it, and how should it apply here?” 
Under AEDPA’s “unreasonable application” standard, the court may 
only ask, “Is this interpretation of law an absolutely impermissible 
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent?”181 If the state court decision 
at issue is not absolutely impermissible, the court applying AEDPA must 
affirm.182 This subtlety is often lost on courts not applying AEDPA.183 
                                                     
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 73.  
181. See id. at 75 (“The ‘unreasonable application’ clause requires the state court decision to be 
more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s application of clearly established law must be 
objectively unreasonable.” (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409, 410 (2000)). 
182. See id. In making that analysis, courts applying AEDPA look to other interpretations to 
determine what is reasonable. Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600–01 (2000). If they look to 
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For that reason, the difference between the de novo standard (defining 
the law) and the AEDPA standard (defining the limits of the law) sets 
the stage for shift in substantive law. 
The AEDPA standard poses a significant risk of narrowing the 
Miranda right to counsel in its interplay with Davis v. United States.184 
AEDPA creates a one-way ratchet effect, narrowing the set of phrases 
considered effective to invoke a suspect’s right to counsel to only the 
most obvious. This occurs as follows: first, a federal court is presented 
with a case in which a constitutionally questionable (but not “objectively 
unreasonable”) invocation decision resulted in a conviction, and affirms 
it under the § 2254(d)(1) standard of review, although it might not have 
under a de novo standard. Then, when that case is published, it becomes 
precedent that is cited by lower courts to reach similar conclusions on 
the merits of invocation cases. 
To illustrate these two steps, we can look to an individual phrase. In 
the first step, a state court rejects a given phrase as a right-to-counsel 
invocation, and a federal habeas court gives deference to that rejection. 
A criminal suspect taken into custody makes a reference to counsel 
during or prior to his interrogation (for example, “Could I get a 
lawyer?”). Police, hoping to get a confession, do not interpret the 
reference as a request and continue questioning. When the interrogation 
continues, the suspect makes incriminating statements. Those statements 
are admitted at trial, with the state court determining that the suspect’s 
reference to counsel was not “clear and unequivocal” under Davis,185 
and the defendant is convicted. After exhausting state court remedies,186 
the convict petitions in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus, 
pursuant to AEDPA. The federal court, despite its reluctance to support 
the state court’s interpretation of Davis, is constrained by § 2254. The 
federal habeas court is bound to deny the petition if it determines that the 
state court’s application of Davis was not objectively unreasonable.187 
The second step effectuates the substantive change in law, and turns 
                                                     
other AEDPA cases affirming something at the outside edges of “reasonableness,” there is a strong 
risk that the edge could be pushed even further. 
183. See, e.g., People v. Kamyab, No. B187608, 2007 WL 1492257, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. May 23, 
2007) (citing AEDPA cases but ignoring the AEDPA dimension of the holdings). 
184. 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
185. See id. at 461 (“[L]aw enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the 
suspect clearly requests an attorney.”). 
186. Exhaustion is a required element of an AEDPA habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) 
(2006). 
187. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 
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the ratchet. Here, the federal court’s Davis holding becomes precedent—
or, more precisely, pseudo-precedent—that state courts cite without 
reference to the standard of review. When a new and perhaps clearer 
phrase (such as, “Can I get my lawyer?”) enters the cycle at the state 
court level, prosecutors seeking a conviction find and point to the earlier 
AEDPA case that deemed insufficient the phrase, “Could I get a 
lawyer?” The state court, without parsing the standard of review, looks 
to that earlier AEDPA decision as persuasive authority to deny the new 
defendant’s motion to suppress his incriminating statements, and the 
defendant is convicted. The new phrase (“Can I get my lawyer?”) then 
enters federal court in an AEDPA habeas petition, becoming its own 
pseudo-precedent, and the process begins anew. 
AEDPA’s ratchet effect only goes one way. A federal court applying 
AEDPA is deciding not what the law is, but what the limits are for a 
reasonable application of the law. When it decides those limits in the 
context of right-to-counsel invocations, it will always be considering 
phrases that were not clear enough to halt the interrogation in the first 
place.188 Because only convicts can seek habeas corpus review, federal 
courts applying AEDPA will never be asked, “Was this statement, 
interpreted as clear below, actually ambiguous?” Therefore, those courts 
will always be in a position to apply deference to the police, rather than 
the defendant. This effect pushes invocation jurisprudence to the outer 
limit of what constitutes a “reasonable” interpretation of Davis. Once 
that limit is reached, the law will not stray far from it. As soon as one 
court, whether applying AEDPA or not, interprets the law in a certain 
way, it is more likely that a subsequent court will view that 
interpretation as a reasonable one taken by “fairminded jurists.”189 
Through the two-step process described above, a federal court creates 
AEDPA pseudo-precedent deeming a phrase inadequate to invoke the 
right to counsel, even if it might have interpreted it on de novo review as 
a clear and unequivocal request. The net result is a more restrictive 
standard for valid invocations than was perhaps originally intended. 
                                                     
188. See Strauss, supra note 15, at 1034 (noting that clear and unambiguous invocations of the 
right to counsel might never make it into published opinions). 
189. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (holding that a federal 
habeas writ may only be granted if “there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree”). This 
is despite the Court’s earlier warning that a decision is not reasonable merely because “at least one 
of the Nation’s jurists has applied the relevant federal law in the same manner the state court did.” 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409–10 (2000). 
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B. AEDPA Cases Set a High Clarity Burden that is Then Cited in 
Non-AEDPA Decisions 
The narrowing process begins when a federal habeas court applies to 
a given phrase a standard of clarity that goes beyond what that court 
might have decided on de novo review. One can most easily observe 
AEDPA’s effect with reference to individual cases.190 The following two 
cases illustrate this phenomenon by a quantitative measurement of their 
effects.191 
1. Twenty-Eight Cases Have Cited the Phrase “I Think I Need a 
Lawyer” to Reject Purported Invocations 
On the night of January 13, 1993, Russel Burket brutally murdered 
Katherine and Ashley Tafelski in their Virginia home.192 Seven days 
later, when police questioned him as a suspect, Burket made two 
statements about counsel, roughly twelve minutes apart.193 After the first 
statement, “I’m gonna need a lawyer,” the police detectives advised 
Burket that he was not under arrest and was free to go, after which the 
interview resumed and Burket admitted to killing the victims.194 He then 
said, “I think I need a lawyer,” at which point the detectives frisked him, 
Mirandized him, and placed him in custody.195 The trial court denied 
Burket’s motion to suppress his videotaped confession.196 Burket pled 
guilty to the murders, as well as three other crimes associated with them, 
“reserving the right to challenge on appeal the admissibility of his 
confession.”197 The court sentenced Burket to death.198 
                                                     
190. It is difficult to say empirically whether AEDPA is responsible for narrowing the Miranda 
right to counsel because of the varied nature of invocation phrases and the Court’s demonstrated 
antipathy to Miranda in other areas. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 
2260 (2010) (extending the Davis reasoning to the right to silence and requiring affirmative, verbal 
invocation); see also Strauss, supra note 15, at 1033–34 (explaining the challenges of a 
comprehensive analysis of Davis). 
191. I chose these two examples not because they definitively show that a phrase that would pass 
muster on de novo review fails on AEDPA review. That is almost impossible to demonstrate as 
courts issuing published opinions are loath to undermine their own decisions by stating that they 
disagree with the outcome. Rather, the examples used demonstrate how a phrase that might 
reasonably be interpreted as a valid invocation under Davis could be affected by AEDPA. 
192. Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 177–80 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1283. 
193. Id. at 195. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 180. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
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Although Burket raised numerous issues in his subsequent federal 
habeas petition, the only one relevant to this analysis was Burket’s 
assertion that police violated his Miranda right to counsel.199 The Fourth 
Circuit panel, reviewing the case under AEDPA, determined that it was 
not unreasonable for the Virginia Supreme Court to conclude that 
Burket’s first statement, “I’m gonna need a lawyer,” had not effectively 
invoked Burket’s right to counsel because it was made prior to arrest.200 
The Fourth Circuit then held that his second statement, “I think I need a 
lawyer,” was inadequate as a request for counsel.201 The court dismissed 
Burket’s appeal.202 
To date, Burket has been cited in some 386 state and federal cases.203 
Of those, thirty-two were non-AEDPA cases citing Burket on the right-
to-counsel issue. In twenty-eight of those cases, Burket’s phrase, “I think 
I need a lawyer,” was cited analogically to demonstrate that another 
similar phrase was insufficient to invoke the right to counsel.204 None of 
the twenty-eight cases discussed Burket’s AEDPA standard of review,205 
and none expressly acknowledged that the Fourth Circuit might have 
decided otherwise had it been reviewing the issue de novo. 
Of the twenty-eight cases citing Burket to reject a suspect’s claimed 
invocation of the right to counsel, eleven were state cases possibly 
subject to future AEDPA review.206 Additionally, many state trial courts 
                                                     
199. See id. at 196. 
200. Id. at 197.  
201. Id. at 197–98. 
202. Id. at 201. 
203. Search of WESTLAW, KeyCite service (Nov. 10, 2011) (search for state and federal cases 
citing Burket). 
204. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 281 F. App’x. 198, 199–200 (4th Cir. 2008) (“I think I 
might need to talk to a lawyer.”); United States v. Williams, No. 5:08-CR-174-FL-1, 2009 WL 
497143, at *1–2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 28, 2009) (“I don’t think I want to say anything more until I talk to 
a lawyer.”), aff’d, No. 09-4812, 2011 WL 4361556 (4th Cir. Sept. 20, 2011); United States v. 
Brown, Crim No. 06-148(01) (JMR/RLE), 2006 WL 2314057, at *14–15 (D. Minn. Aug. 9, 2006) 
(“Can I call my lawyer?”); United States v. Sprouse, No. CRIM 5:01CR30051, 2002 WL 15866, at 
*4 (W.D. Va. Jan. 8, 2002) (noting that suspect told police “that his counsel had advised him not to 
speak with police”); People v. Donahee, No. 296050, 2011 WL 923501, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 
17, 2011) (“I think this is where I need an attorney.”); People v. Kamyab, No. B187608, 2007 WL 
1492257, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. May 23, 2007) (“I think it’s time I called my attorney.”). One court 
cited Burket’s alleged right-to-silence invocations as justification for holding invalid a right-to-
counsel invocation. United States v. Peters, 435 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2006). 
205. But see United States v. DeGounette, No. 05-CR-45S, 2007 WL 607234, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 22, 2007) (noting Burket’s standard of review in a right-to-silence context); see also United 
States v. Jourdain, Criminal No. 06-313 (01-02) (RHK/RLE), 2007 WL 269827, at *21–22 (D. 
Minn. Jan. 26, 2007) (discussing Burket and Dormire v. Wilkinson, 249 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 
2001), and noting Dormire’s AEDPA standard of review, but not Burket’s).  
206. Some of them did reach AEDPA review. For example, People v. Kamyab, 2007 WL 
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have likely cited Burket in denials of motions to suppress based on the 
Miranda right to counsel, and there are appellate opinions citing to 
Burket in at least five states.207 These opinions have almost certainly 
influenced trial court decisions. 
2.  Twenty-Five Cases Have Cited the Phrase “I Think I Would Like to 
Talk to a Lawyer” to Reject Purported Invocations 
In a more recent case, habeas petitioner Billy Russell Clark 
challenged his conviction in an Arizona court for the murder of his 
stepmother, Anita Clark.208 After police arrested and Mirandized him, 
two police detectives interviewed Clark after he waived his Miranda 
rights.209 During the interview, a Detective Chambers informed Clark 
that “there were serious problems with [his] story.”210 Clark replied by 
saying, “I think I would like to talk to a lawyer.”211 Rather than halting 
the interview, the detective told Clark that “if he wanted a lawyer 
[Chambers] would call him one,” and left him alone “for a few minutes 
to make a decision,” saying that when he returned “[he] would expect 
[Clark’s] answer.”212 When Detective Chambers returned some thirty 
minutes later, Clark indicated that he did not want a lawyer and would 
continue talking.213 After another twenty minutes of questioning, Clark 
                                                     
1492257, led to a federal habeas petition, which the district court denied. Kamyab v. Uribe, No. CV 
08-5557GAF (FMO), 2009 WL 1520022, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2009). 
207. See People v. Kamyab, 2007 WL 1492257, at *7 (statement “I think it’s time I called my 
attorney” invalid); Donahee, 2011 WL 923501, at *2 (statement “I think this is where I need an 
attorney” invalid as invocation); People v. Powell, 304 A.D.2d 410, 410–11 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) 
(statement that he “thought he would wait for a lawyer” invalid); Com. v. Epps, No. 2271-09-1, 
2010 WL 1439390, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2010) (holding that question “Can I have my 
lawyer present? . . . for now” invalid). In another case, In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. 2008), the 
majority cited Burket in upholding the validity of the suspect’s statement that he “wanted his mother 
to ask for an attorney,” id. at 325–26 (internal quotation marks omitted), while the dissent also cited 
it to argue against the statement’s adequacy as an invocation, id. at 330 (Jefferson, J., dissenting). 
208. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 968. 
209. Id. at 1064–65. 
210. Id. at 1065. 
211. Id. The court noted that the record was inconsistent as to whether Clark said “I think I would 
like to talk to a lawyer,” or “I think I’d like to talk to a lawyer.” Id. at 1065 n.2. Like the Arizona 
court, the Ninth Circuit opted for the first phrase, but suggested that there was not any difference 
between the two for the purposes of its analysis. Id. This is noteworthy because it demonstrates the 
exacting precision with which courts examine everyday phraseology when they apply the Davis 
“clear and unequivocal request” rule. That precision lies at the core of the AEDPA ratchet effect 
because courts closely examining a possible invocation will look to other courts’ interpretations, 
some of them made through AEDPA’s deferential prism. 
212. Id. at 1065.  
213. Id. 
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asked the detective, “should I be telling you or should I talk to a 
lawyer?”214 Detective Chambers responded by saying that, in his 
opinion, a judge or jury would consider remorse as more important than 
fear of punishment, and the interview continued.215 Soon after that, Clark 
confessed to the murder.216 Before trial, he moved to suppress his 
confession, but the trial court denied his motion, and a jury ultimately 
convicted Clark of second degree murder and theft.217 
Clark’s federal habeas petition, filed under AEDPA, rested primarily 
on his assertion that the state trial court erred by admitting his 
confession, which he contended was taken in violation of Edwards v. 
Arizona.218 A magistrate judge determined that Clark had made an 
unambiguous request for counsel and that the Arizona Court of Appeals 
was unreasonable in holding otherwise.219 The district court, however, 
rejected this conclusion and denied Clark’s habeas petition.220 The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed.221 In reaching its conclusion, the court spent several 
sentences discussing Burket v. Angelone,222 and comparing the statement 
in that case (“I think I need a lawyer”223), with Clark’s (“I think I would 
like to talk to a lawyer”).224 The court also discussed at length the 
presence of the phrase, “I think,” in the statement.225 The Ninth Circuit 
denied Clark’s appeal.226 
It is noteworthy that the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in this case 
some five months before amending and superseding it with a second 
opinion.227 The amended opinion was published three months after the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s excoriation of the Ninth Circuit’s AEDPA 
approach in Lockyer v. Andrade.228 In its original opinion, the court 
                                                     
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 1065–66. 
216. Id. at 1066. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 1069 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)). 
219. Id. at 1066. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 1071.  
222. 208 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 2000). 
223. Id. at 197. 
224. Clark, 331 F.3d at 1071. 
225. Id. at 1070–71. 
226. Id. at 1072. 
227. Id. at 1064; see also Clark v. Murphy, 317 F.3d 1038, opinion amended and superseded on 
denial of reh’g, 331 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2003). 
228. 538 U.S. 63, 75–77 (2003). 
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stated, “While the issue is a close one, we conclude that Clark’s 
statement that he thought he would like to talk to a lawyer did not 
constitute an unambiguous and unequivocal request for counsel within 
the meaning of Davis.”229 The court removed this language from the 
amended opinion, stating instead that “the Arizona court’s determination 
that Clark’s statement did not constitute an unambiguous and 
unequivocal request for counsel within the meaning of Davis was not 
contrary to clearly established [f]ederal law, nor was it an objectively 
unreasonable application of such law.”230 
The change in the superseding opinion is significant for two reasons. 
First, the court originally expressed some reluctance to reject the 
purported invocation before clarifying that what was “reasonable” was 
the actual issue in the case. Second, it makes clear that the court 
recognized the subtle, but important, difference between the two 
holdings (helped along by Lockyer) and saw the need to state it directly 
in its revised opinion. The fact that the court’s expression of reluctance 
is absent from the post-Lockyer ruling shows how AEDPA obscures a 
court’s underlying outlook on the constitutional issue at play. This 
masking of the court’s underlying logic makes it difficult for subsequent 
courts to determine the law as described in AEDPA’s pseudo-precedent. 
Clark would be more useful as accurate guidance on invocation law if 
AEDPA had not masked the court’s reluctance. 
Clark has been cited in some 2298 state and federal cases.231 Of those, 
113 cited Clark on the right-to-counsel issue, of which twenty-nine were 
non-AEDPA cases. In all but four of those twenty-nine cases, Clark’s 
statement, “I think I want to talk to a lawyer,” was cited as persuasive 
precedent to hold on de novo review that a similar phrase was 
insufficient to invoke the right to counsel.232 Of the twenty-five cases 
                                                     
229. Clark, 317 F.3d at 1046–47. 
230. Clark, 331 F.3d at 1071.  
231. Search of WESTLAW, KeyCite service (Nov. 10, 2011) (search for state and federal cases 
citing Clark). 
232. See, e.g., People v. Gaeta, No. F048162, 2006 WL 3233830, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 
2006) (holding that phrase, “I need an attorney then cause . . . I don’t know what’s going on with 
this,” equivocal under the circumstances); People v. Roquemore, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 214, 224–25 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2005) (question, “[C]an I call a lawyer or my mom to talk to you?” ambiguous); Davis v. 
State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 339 n.53, 339–41 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (phrase, “I should have an 
attorney,” not a request for counsel). In one case, United States v. Fry, No. CR-09-44-N-JLQ, 2009 
WL 1687958, at *4, *11–14 (D. Idaho June 16, 2009), the court determined that the defendant’s 
question, “Do I get to have a lawyer to sit in?” was ambiguous, id. at 11, but police had failed to 
clarify as required under United States v. Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring 
police to clarify ambiguous pre-waiver requests). Fry, 2009 WL 1687958, at *12–14. In another, 
People v. Sims, No. 285475, 2009 WL 1693722 (Mich. Ct. App. June 16, 2009), the court applied 
 
WLR December Rubenstein FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/8/2011 4:50 PM 
2011] AEDPA’S RATCHET 935 
 
citing Clark to hold an invocation invalid, eleven were state cases, 
themselves subject to possible federal AEDPA review. In the four cases 
in which Clark’s phrase was not used to hold invalid a right-to-counsel 
invocation, it was cited twice in dissent,233 once as contrary precedent in 
a holding of validity,234 and once against an invocation of the right to 
silence.235 Only one decision noted that Clark was decided under the 
AEDPA standard of review.236 
Both Burket and Clark demonstrate the risk that the AEDPA standard 
of review poses to the integrity of substantive law.237 State and federal 
trial courts are prone to treat precedent like Burket and Clark as 
determinative of what constitutes a valid request for counsel, rather than 
what is not an “objectively unreasonable” interpretation of Davis. When 
federal courts appear to reject phrases as clear to the layperson as “I 
think I would like to talk to a lawyer” or “I think I want a lawyer,” they 
become powerfully persuasive to judges analyzing similar statements or 
questions in courts of the first instance.238 
                                                     
Clark in considering the phrase, “I think I should have an attorney here, you know,” but used a 
“clear error” rather than de novo standard of review. Id. at *2. 
233. People v. Nelson, No. G040151, 2010 WL 673215, at *25–26 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2010) 
(Aronson, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority’s holding that suspect’s requests to speak to his mother 
constituted an invocation of his Miranda rights); In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319, 331 n.2 (Tex. 2008) 
(Jefferson, J., dissenting) (with reference to Clark’s habeas posture, rejecting majority’s holding that 
suspect’s statement that he “wanted his mother to ask an attorney” was valid as invocation). 
234. People v. Jones, No. 273193, 2007 WL 292532, at *2–3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2007) 
(holding “[C]an I have one now while we talk?” is a valid invocation). 
235. State v. Payne, 199 P.3d 123, 134 (Idaho 2008). 
236. Kaczmarek v. State, 91 P.3d 16, 27 n.31 (Nev. 2004). 
237. Burket and Clark are not alone in the realm of the Miranda right to counsel. See, e.g., 
Dormire v. Wilkinson, 249 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 2001) (phrase, “Could I call my lawyer?” cited 
in twenty-eight non-AEDPA federal cases and eight state cases, mostly to deny motions to suppress 
founded on Miranda right to counsel). 
238. In addition to narrowing the invocation standard, AEDPA may have also expanded the 
situations in which Davis applies. As many scholars have noted, the Davis “clear and unequivocal 
request” rule originally applied only to phrases uttered after the suspect had waived his Miranda 
rights. See Harvey Gee, Essay: When Do You Have to Be Clear?: Reconsidering Davis v. United 
States, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 381, 399–414 (2001); supra note 106. However, many courts have 
erroneously applied Davis to statements made before a suspect has waived his right to counsel. See 
2 LAFAVE ET. AL., supra note 8, at 866 n.185 (listing numerous cases applying Davis pre-waiver). 
 AEDPA has exacerbated this broadening of the Davis rule into pre-waiver invocations in the 
same way as it narrowed suspects’ invocation options. When courts have applied Davis pre-waiver, 
they have made its application pre-waiver not “objectively unreasonable.” This made it easier for 
courts to apply the “clear and unequivocal request” rule pre-waiver on AEDPA review. See 
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (holding that a federal habeas writ 
may only be granted if “there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree”). Additionally, 
because the U.S. Supreme Court left open the question of what rule applies to statements made 
before a suspect has waived his Miranda rights, it cannot be “clearly established [f]ederal law.” 28 
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V. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT SHOULD DISCOURAGE 
COURTS NOT APPLYING AEDPA FROM RELYING ON 
AEDPA CASES 
AEDPA presents a substantial risk of weakening substantive 
constitutional protections, both in the case of the Miranda right to 
counsel and in other areas of criminal law. Typically, this shift will 
narrow defendants’ rights because AEDPA is only applied in cases in 
which defendants are convicted, and it requires a high degree of 
deference to those convictions.239 
As described above,240 this ratchet effect will perpetuate itself as state 
courts cite federal AEDPA decisions to reject defendants’ constitutional 
challenges, and those defendants then challenge their convictions in 
federal habeas petitions governed by AEDPA. The net result will be that 
the rights that the Court articulated will be whittled away to their bare 
minimum. In the case of invoking the Miranda right to counsel, this 
ratchet effect could pare down the phrases acceptable to satisfy the 
Davis clear and unequivocal request rule to only the most crystal clear. 
As Justice Souter put it, courts and police will expect “suspects to speak 
with the discrimination of an Oxford don.”241 
For these reasons, courts rendering a decision on anything other than 
the AEDPA standard of review should refrain from relying on cases 
                                                     
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006); see Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that where the U.S. Supreme Court has expressly left a question open, it cannot be “clearly 
established” and courts applying AEDPA must affirm).  
 This problem is particularly pointed in the Ninth Circuit, which requires police to clarify 
ambiguous pre-waiver invocations, but not those made after a waiver. United States v. Rodriguez, 
518 F.3d 1072, 1074, 1078–79 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008). So, where a court in the Ninth Circuit is 
reviewing a case de novo, it will apply Rodriguez and may grant a motion to suppress, e.g., United 
States v. Nejbauer, No. CR09-0670-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 3710713, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 2, 
2009); but on AEDPA review, it will disregard Rodriguez and the motion’s denial will stand, e.g., 
Sessoms v. Runnels, 650 F.3d 1276, 1283–84, 1289–90 (9th Cir. 2011). This phenomenon amounts 
to an internal circuit split. 
 The Court recently mooted this issue in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 
2260 (2010), by implicitly extending the Davis “clear and unequivocal request” rule to pre-waiver 
situations. In dissent, Justice Sotomayor vigorously disputed the Court’s ruling, saying that the 
Davis holding is “explicitly predicated” on the existence of the suspect’s prior valid waiver. Id. at 
2275 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
239. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 
409–12 (2000)) (“The unreasonable application clause requires the state court decision to be more 
than incorrect or erroneous. . . . [it] must be objectively unreasonable.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
240. See supra Part IV. 
241. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 476 (Souter, J., concurring). 
WLR December Rubenstein FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/8/2011 4:50 PM 
2011] AEDPA’S RATCHET 937 
 
decided under AEDPA. Both state and federal courts should exercise 
this restraint, although federal courts are at a somewhat lower risk of 
ratcheting down defendants’ rights because their decisions will not be 
subject to subsequent review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This precaution 
would arrest the AEDPA ratchet effect and confine the scope of the 
legislation to what Congress originally intended.242 In other words, the 
restrictive shift AEDPA created will halt where it stands. In order to put 
this halt into effect, the U.S. Supreme Court should discourage courts 
from basing their decisions on AEDPA cases unless the citing court is 
also applying AEDPA.243 
While it is true that this precaution would limit the range of citable 
opinions, there would be ample precedent available to trial courts and 
direct-review appeals courts. First, any non-AEDPA decision (both state 
and federal) would be available. Additionally, there are at least six years 
of habeas decisions applying Davis untainted by AEDPA. Davis was 
decided in 1994, two years before AEDPA’s enactment, and AEDPA’s 
standard of review did not control most of the habeas cases decided by 
federal appeals courts from 1996 to 2000.244 Almost all of these cases 
decided Davis issues on a de novo standard of review, and courts 
continue to apply that standard in non-AEDPA cases.245 
Even if they persist in citing AEDPA cases, courts not applying 
AEDPA should acknowledge the statute’s highly deferential standard of 
review. They should also account for the standard’s effect on the 
substantive constitutional analysis in the case they are citing. This 
approach may be wise. Federal decisions rendered under AEDPA could 
conceivably have legitimate precedential or persuasive value to trial or 
direct review courts. For example, a trial court might face an unclear 
area of federal law and cite an AEDPA case to say what the law is, 
regardless of how it should be applied or what interpretations of it are 
                                                     
242. See supra text accompanying notes 141–153. 
243. The Court is not the only entity that can act in this space. Some have argued that Congress 
should eliminate all federal habeas corpus review of state court convictions except for rare “cases 
where the remedial benefits of the Great Writ will be worth the costs.” Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy 
J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 818–23 
(2009). This solution, while extreme and not endorsed here, would also tend to eliminate AEDPA’s 
ratchet effect by halting the practice of federal courts decreeing what is and is not contrary to, or an 
unreasonable application of, U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 
244. See Blume, supra note 20, at 284. 
245. See, e.g., United States v. Montes, 602 F.3d 381, 384–85 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
“Maybe I should get an attorney” or “Do I need an attorney?” are not valid invocations on de novo 
review), cert. denied sub nom., Armijo v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 177. 
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reasonable.246 In other words, a court may need an AEDPA case with 
similar facts to “correctly identif[y] the governing legal rule,”247 even if 
it does not look to that case as guidance for application of the rule. Even 
if it uses the interpretation deemed reasonable by the AEDPA decision, 
the non-AEDPA court in this scenario should be careful to note the 
confining and deferential nature of the AEDPA standard of review. 
In addition, federal courts deciding habeas petitions under 
§ 2254(d)(1) should clearly state the standard of review applied in their 
holdings. If a federal court of appeals, deciding a case under AEDPA, 
states clearly in its holding that it is only determining that the decision 
on review was not “objectively unreasonable,”248 a non-AEDPA court 
would likely find the holding less persuasive than if that caveat were 
absent.249 By inserting such a warning, federal courts applying AEDPA 
would help mitigate AEDPA’s effect on substantive constitutional law. 
However, the approach of adding an explicit reference to the standard of 
review is merely a precautionary supplement to, and cannot replace, the 
U.S. Supreme Court admonition proposed above. 
CONCLUSION 
AEDPA’s ratchet effect has narrowed the substantive constitutional 
protections afforded by the Miranda right to counsel by making the 
Davis “clear and unequivocal request” rule harder to satisfy. However, 
this effect is not restricted to the Miranda right to counsel. Any number 
of other substantive areas of criminal law could be affected in the same 
way. Because a federal court reviewing a state court ruling under 
AEDPA must ask only if the state ruling is an “objectively 
unreasonable” application of federal law, any potentially “reasonable” 
interpretation of substantive law will stand, even if it is “incorrect or 
erroneous.”250 That federal decision upholding as reasonable the state 
                                                     
246. Indeed, § 2254 requires a federal court to first determine what is the federal law “as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). 
247. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407–08 (2000). 
248. See, e.g., Sessoms v. Runnels, 650 F.3d 1276, 1288, 1289 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating its 
AEDPA holdings clearly). 
249. But compare Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 198 (4th Cir. 2000) (expressly holding that 
the Virginia Supreme Court’s rejection of defendant’s Miranda right-to-counsel claim “was not 
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States”), and Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(same with regard to Arizona court ruling), with People v. Kamyab, No. B187608, 2007 WL 
1492257, *7 (Cal. Ct. App. May 23, 2007) (citing both Burket and Clark, but ignoring the AEDPA 
dimension of the holdings). 
250. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409–12). 
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court’s interpretation can then be cited by any lower court, even though 
it does not represent the federal court’s own interpretation of federal law, 
as would be the case in the pre-AEDPA de novo standard of review. In 
the case of the Miranda right to counsel, this means that as more and 
more AEDPA precedent is created, state-court interpretations of federal 
rights will supplant those of lower federal courts, resulting in the strictest 
invocation standard Davis will allow. That is, thanks in part to AEDPA, 
suspects wishing to invoke their right to counsel may ultimately be 
required to say nothing less clear than, “I want a lawyer.” 
